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protecting an individual client's identity. In these situations, in which a sub-
stantial prejudice factor is involved, the courts should promote freedom of
consultation by protecting the client's identity in the same manner as they
protect any other confidential communication to an attorney.
MEDICAL DEDUCTION: TEST AND APPLICATION
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides relief for taxpayers who have
incurred substantial medical costs during the tax year.' Section 2132 allows
a limited 3 deduction of "the expenses.., for medical care of the taxpayer,
his spouse, or a dependent. . . .- 4 Although the original purpose of the al-
lowance was not clearly explained,5 the medical deduction is now generally
recognized as an additional element of "ability to pay" considerations in the
federal income tax system.6
The expenses of medical care, as defined by the Code, are the amounts
paid "for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease,
or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body (including
amounts paid for accident or health insurance), or... for transportation
primarily for and essential to... [the enumerated functions]." 7 The courts
have encountered several recurring problems in applying this definition
of medical expense. It was not made clear, for example, whether expense
I By providing tax reductions to those who have incurred medical costs, Congress inflicts
a greater burden upon other taxpayers. Thus, to a degree, the costs of illness are diffused
throughout the society. For analyses of the economic effects of this form of "socializing"
medical care, see KAiHN, PERSONAL DEDUCTIONS IN THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 126-61
(1960); Jensen, Medical Expenditures and Medical Deduction Plans, LX J. POL. ECON.
503-24 (1952).
2 A medical deduction was originally provided in 1942 as an amendment to the 1939
Code. Revenue Act of 1942, § 127, 56 Stat. 825. The definition of allowable deductions
was substantially maintained in the 1954 Code.
3 Section 213(a) stipulates that only medical costs in excess of 3% of adjusted gross
income are deductible. Sections 213(c) and 213(g) establish maximum amounts per person.
4 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213(a). A deduction is not the sole means of providing tax
relief for medical expenses. For a discussion of alternative proposals, see Jensen, Rationale
of the Medical Expense Deduction, 7 NAT'L TAX J. 274 (1954).
5 There is, for example, evidence that the deduction was to be a temporary, wartime
relief measure. S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942): "This allowance is recom-
mended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that must be borne by individuals during
the existing emergency and of the desirability of maintaining the present high level of public
health and morale."
6 See Note, Medical Deduction: Scope and Purpose, 28 IND. L. J. 264 (1953). Judge
Frank viewed the provision as an unparalleled display of legislative charity. Dissenting
in Ochs v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1952), he observed that, in allowing
a deduction for medical costs, "for once, Congress, although seeking revenue, shows it
has a heart .... "
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213(e).
was to include expenditures normally designated as capital in nature. Also,
the definition of medical could not be implemented without the use of more
specific directives to provide a consistent basis for the disposition of deduction
claims.
Since no legislative clarification was forthcoming, the courts were left
to their own devices. Despite the difficulty of the task, there has been little
published criticism of the manner in which these problems have been re-
solved.8 Difficult cases, however, continue to arise. An examination of the
means by which courts have disposed of prior controversies may be beneficial
in the attempt to resolve current disputes.
I
The contrasting concepts of deductible expenses and non-deductible capital
expenditures is familiar to tax practitioners. Since the Code provision estab-
lishes a deduction only for medical "expenses," the deductibility of ordinarily
capital expenditures made for medical reasons was disputed. In a 1950
case,9 the Tax Court held that the cost of an oil-burning furnace, obtained
through a wartime priority resulting from a physician's affidavit, was not de-
ductible as a medical expense. The taxpayer, submitting the physician's
statement, claimed that the purchase had been necessitated by irritations
caused by a coal furnace which aggravated asthma, hay fever and chronic
sinusitus conditions among the members of the household. The validity
of this claim was not judged. The court said that the cost was a capital
expenditure of permanent benefit to the family and that capital expenditures
were non-deductible throughout the Code.10
The rationale of the "oil furnace" case was the basis for the disallowance
of several similar claims. The principle was not confined, however, to cases
where permanent benefit had accrued to the taxpayer. In Estate of C. L.
Hayne," for example, the installation of an elevator in the home of a partially
paralyzed invalid was held non-deductible on the authority of the oil furance
case12 even though there was evidence that the value of the property had been
reduced.13 Immediately thereafter, in Edna G. Hollander,14 the Hayne decision
8But see Bardes, What Is Meant by Medical Expense?, N.Y.U. Il1TH INST. ON FED.
TAX 1227 (1953).
9 John L. Seymour, 14 T.C. 1111 (1950).
10 Id. at 1118: "We are unable to find in the history of the statute any evidence of an
intent by Congress to create an exception to the general rule that capital expenditures are
not deductible as current expenses."
11 22 T.C. 113 (1954).
12 Id. at 122: "Under the authorities cited we think the cost of the installation of the
elevator undoubtedly was a capital expenditure and hence is not deductible...." The
court also suggested that the expense was incurred to solve a transportation problem which
was merely incidental to the illness.
13 Id. at 121. 1422 T.C. 646 (1954).
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was used to disallow the deduction of an inclinator purchased for the home of
one recovering from a coronary thrombosis.' 5
The Third Ciruit reversed Hollander on appeal.16 The court found that
"there is no specific statutory direction of non-deductibility [for this type
of expenditure]."1 7 Also, it observed that the Commissioner's stand on capital
expenditures was ambivalent for, although this case was vigorously contested,
other capital expenditures were explicitly allowed: "The Commissioner's
own regulations... include a medical deduction for 'artificial teeth or
limbs.' "18 Restrictions of precedent having been removed, the congressional
intent was examined and the deduction allowed: "It seems to us that we are
here dealing with a true medical expense under the letter and spirit of the
Code."19
The Hollander decision has generally been followed.20 However, in Frank
S. Delp,21 the prior Tax Court cases were followed, producing an interesting
result: "Accordingly, although the expenditure in question was made solely
for the purpose of mitigating a physical ailment, was prescribed by a physi-
cian, and bore a close relationship to the illness of Edna Delp both in time
and effectiveness of treatment, thereby falling within the ambit of section
213(e)(1) of the 1954 Code, [the claim is disallowed]."22
The recurrence of similar results is not expected. The Commissioner
no longer insists that all capital expenditures are non-deductible: "[E]xpendi-
tures made for medical purposes will not be disallowed merely because they
are of a capital nature. However, it is the position of the Service that the
capital nature of an expenditure will be a consideration in determining its
deductibility. If such expenditures constitute amounts paid out for permanent
improvements which increase the value of any property or estate, they will
not be allowed as medical expense deductions."2 3 The meaning of "expense"
was substantially resolved in this manner; the definition of "medical"
presents a continuing problem.
I
To administer the medical relief provision, it has been necessary to distin-
guish the expenditures for which the deduction is allowed from those personal,
's Id. at 648: "The case is not distinguishable in principle from Estate of C. L.
Ilayne. . ...
16Hollander v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1955).
17 Id. at 936-37 n.4. 1 Id. at 936. 19 Id. at 937.
20 Berry v. Wiseman, 174 F. Supp. 748 (W.D. Okla. 1958); Post v. United States, 150
F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Ala. 1956); Snellings v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Va. 1956).
21 30 T.C. 1230 (1958).
22 Id. at 1235.
23 Rev. Rul. 411, 1959-2 Cum. BuLL. 100-01.
non-deductible expenses which have a beneficial effect upon the health of
an individual, but which are incurred as normal costs by a significant sector
of the population.24 Thus, expenditures for personal hygiene and general
health improvement have been disallowed. 25 Since the purpose of the deduc-
tion is to provide relief for unusual expenses, this general exclusion is wholly
consistent with the provision. Not all claims are so easily resolved.
The legislative definition could have been made rigid and specific. For
example, Congress might have created an exclusive list of particular allowable
expenses. 26 The expenses listed would then constitute the sole items of
deductible medical care. Other costs, regardless of medical value in particular
instances, would be automatically disallowed.
Instead, a method permitting maximum flexibility was chosen. The allow-
ance of a claimed deduction depends upon sufficient demonstration of a causal
connection between a specific malady and the expense incurred.27 Thus,
it has been said that "a deduction may be claimed only for such expense as is
incurred primarily for the prevention or mitigation of the particular physical
or mental defect or illness."2 8 The same difficulties that beset courts whenever
proximity is relevant prevent a more specific statement of the rule. The
decision is rendered as a factual determination.29 The burden of proof, of
course, is upon the taxpayer.
The generality of the rule has limited its value in determining the deducti-
bility of a particular claim. To apply the statutory definition, therefore, certain
tests were evolved to provide a reasonably consistent basis for decision.
The taxpayer must generally show that a specific illness existed,30 that the
expenditure was made in a reasonable attempt to avoid harms created
by the illness, 31 and that the expenditure was not made for personal, non-
medical benefit.32
24 See Brrxna, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE AND GiFr TAXATION 158-65 (1955 ed.);
SuRREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 328-35 (1960 ed.).
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(ii) (1957); Rev. Rul. 261, 1955-1 Cum. BuLL. 307, 312.
26 See Note, supra note 6, at 268-69.
27 Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949): "To be deductible as medical expense,
there must be a direct or proximate relation between the expense and the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or the expense must have been incurred for
the purpose of affecting some structure or function of the body."
28 L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580, 584 (1949).
29 Commissioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950).
30 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
31 Cf. Vincent P. Ring, 23 T.C. 950 (1955), where a journey to the religious shrine at
Lourdes was held to be in quest of spiritual, not physical, aid.
32 Cf. John J. Thoene, 33 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 21, 1959), where the cost of dancing lessons
was disallowed although there was evidence that the lessons were advised by a physician
to provide the taxpayer with light exercise during post-surgery recovery.
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Several factors are commonly considered in the application of these tests.
Although some medical benefit may collaterally accrue from an expenditure,
the deduction will be disallowed where the taxpayer intended the expenditure
for other purposes. 33 The motives of the taxpayer will not be solely determina-
tive, however.3 4 The advice of a competent physician may be relevant.35
Proximity of the causal relationship between the illness and the expense will
also be examined. 36 The relative weight given to these factors depends upon
the context within which evidence is presented. The substantiating statement
of an unrelated physician, for example, might be accepted more readily
than that of the taxpayer's physician-husband. In another instance, the
expenditure might be so common that no physician's opinion could sustain
the deduction.
It is futile, therefore, to seek an established formula with universal applica-
tion.3 7 An observation of the matters considered and the method employed
must suffice.
I
The deduction, to reflect the legislative intention accurately, should be
allowed only to the extent that the illness has increased the taxpayer's
financial burden. In Rodgers v. Commissioner,38 the taxpayer claimed a
deduction for the cost of travel allegedly necessitated by illness. Since the
trips were substantially similar to his pre-illness travel, the taxpayer failed.
An increase in his financial burden had not been proved.
A single expenditure may yield both medical and non-medical benefit.
In such a case, the problem of determining an increased financial burden
poses peculiar difficulty. Since no solution was suggested by the statute,
the dilemma was again left to the courts.
In the frequently discussed 39 case of Ochs v. Commissioner,40 the court
33 See Arnold Namrow, 33 T.C. No. 50 (Nov. 30, 1959), where the expenditure of a
psychiatry student for his own analysis, an experience necessary to his education, was not
deductible as a medical espense.
34 Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409, 412 (1949): "To accord it conclusive weight would
make nugatory the prohibition against allowing personal, living, or family expenses."
35 Ibid.
36 L. Keever Stringham, 12 T.C. 580,584 (1949): "The Congressional intent is sufficiently
evident to require the showing of the present existence or the imminent probability of a
disease, physical or mental defect, or illnss .. . ." (Emphasis added.)
37 Cf. Commissioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950): "Each case of this
character must be decided on its own particular facts, and an opinion from us could
create no rule of thumb for determination of the applicability of the term 'medical care'
to all cases which may arise."
38 241 F.2d 552 (8th Cir. 1957).
39 See authorities cited note 24 supra.
40 195 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 827 (1952).
of appeals, affirming the Tax Court,41 allowed as a deduction no part of the
cost of sending children to a boarding school to relieve tensions upon their
mother, who was attempting to recover from a serious operation for the
removal of a malignancy, and to avoid the recurrence of the throat cancer.
The conclusion of the Tax Court was particularly interesting in view of the
circumstances explicitly noted in the opinion:
Petitioner's two children have not attended private school but have lived at
home and attended public school since a period beginning 5 years after the operation
of December 10, 1943. Petitioner's purpose in sending the children to boarding
school during the year 1946 was to alleviate his wife's pain and suffering in caring
for the children by reason of her inability to speak above a whisper and to prevent
a recurrence of the cancer which was responsible for the condition of her voice.42
Moreover, neither the veracity nor the good faith of the taxpayer was
doubted.43 Although taking cognizance of the Tax Court's comments, the
court of appeals held that the amounts claimed were non-deductible family
expenses.44 Despite the acknowledged medical needs, the non-medical benefit
which collaterally accrued resulted in total disallowance. Judge Frank,
in a dissenting opinion, applied the usual tests and argued that a portion of the
expenditure was a justifiable deduction. 45 The deduction, he concluded,
should be allowed, reduced by the value of the personal benefit to the family
for care and education of the children.46
Judge Frank's opinion suggests a desirable solution. Since the purpose
of the deduction provision is to relieve taxpayers burdened by unusual medical
costs, the amount of the financial burden attributable to medical benefit
should be allowed where a reasonable basis for an apportionment is available.
Thus, where an expense incurred primarily for medical care produces col-
lateral personal, non-medical benefit, the deduction is the amount by which
the expenditure exceeds the value of the collateral benefit.
Apportionments have been employed in several controversies. In William
B. Meister,47 for example, where sudden illness forced the use of more rapid
transportation between two cities than the taxpayer had previously planned
for pleasure, only the difference in cost between the original and the substitute
means of transportation was allowed. A ruling by the Commissioner provides
that the cost of a special diet, required for medical purposes, will be deductible
to the extent that normal food expenditures have been exceeded.48 The total
expense of the prescription diet is not allowable because the amount equal
41 Samuel Ochs, 17 T.C. 130 (1951).
42 Id. at 132.
43 Id. at 134. 45 Id. at 695.
44 195 F.2d at 694. 46 Id. at 697.
47 18 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 889 (1959).
48 Rev. Rul. 261, 1955-1 CuM. BuLL. 307, 312.
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to the taxpayer's normal food cost is merely a substitute for personal ex-
pense.49
Apportionments are appropriate in many other cases. Insurance premiums
for medical care are deductible under section 213.50 When a policy provides
for other benefits, only that portion of the premium attributable to the cost
of medical care insurance can be justified as a medical deduction.51
The regulations suggest that wherever a capital expenditure bestows
permanent benefit, the expenditure may be wholly disallowed.52 If the
requisites of the statutory definition are fulfilled, the amount by which the
total cost exceeds the value of the permanent benefit would seem to be
deductible.
IV
Application of the tests generally and attempts to apportion particularly
are extremely difficult in some cases. An alternative to this flexible application
of the legislative definition which might reduce the hardship of deciding such
cases would be a specific enumeration of deductible items. The statutory
definition of "medical care" was varied by the 1954 Code explicitly to include
transportation expenses "primarily for and essential to" the usual functions
of medical care.5 3 It is arguable that this change was intended to add an ele-
ment of rigidity to the definition.
There is, however, no indication that flexibility has thereby been reduced.
Under the prior statute, deduction was allowed where the travel expenditure
fit the definition of medical care.5 4 Likewise, travel expenses are not deductible
under the 1954 Code unless the requisites of the definition have been proved.
If the general tests are unchanged, therefore, transportation expenses deducti-
ble under the addition to the 1954 Code should have been allowed under
the earlier provisions.
49 See Estate of Eugene Merrick Webb, 30 T.C. 1202 (1958); Doris V. Clark, 29 T.C.
196 (1957).
50 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 213(e).
51 Cf. Pyle, Accident and Sickness Insurance Under Code Sections 104, 105, 106 and
213, 34 TAXES 363, 374 (1956): "Since only that portion of the policy covering benefits
which reimburse the insured for medical expense reduces his otherwise allowable
medical deductions under [the relief provision], only that part of the premium paid by
the taxpayer which is attributable to the medical benefits of such policy may be considered
a deductible medical expense." But see, Heard v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 911 (3d Cir.
1959), where the total premium was allowed.
52 See text accompanying note 23 supra.
53 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213(e).
54 Cf. Commissioner v. Stringham, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950), where the expenses
necessary to send a girl with lung disease to a more favorable climate were held to be
deductible. Although some claims of medical deduction for transportation were denied
because the requisites of "medical care" had not been sufficiently demonstrated, there is
no indication that the denial was made solely because a travel expense was in question.
See Samuel Dobkin, 15 T.C. 886 (1950); Edward A. Havey, 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
There are indications that the explicit allowance of travel costs was meant
to signify an implicit disallowance of certain other expenses. Legislative re-
ports compiled in 1954 noted that lodging and food expenditures, presumably
because of the difficulty in determining medical benefit and increased financial
burden, should be non-deductible.55 Despite this admonition, courts have
allowed both lodging and food costs to be deducted as medical expenses
where sufficient proof has been submitted.5 6
It is interesting to note that the deductibility of food and lodging expenses
during hospitalization is expressly permitted by the Commissioner.5 7 Medical
deduction claims for food and lodging apart from hospitalization may be
equally valid. If the taxpayer has proved that his financial burden has been
increased without a corresponding increase in personal, non-medical benefit,
the deduction should be allowed. A contrary result will contravene the
intended benefits of the relief provision.
The main argument for making the definition of "medical care" more
rigid is that litigation would be reduced.58 This contention is not wholly
tenable. Although travel expense has been explicitly included, litigation has
not been eliminated.59 Unless the enumeration would exclude borderline
cases, the same problems of definition will occur and litigation or compromise
will be necessary. But if the difficult items are excluded merely because
of the difficulty, the purpose of the provision will have been compromised
by disallowing expenses which, in fact, had been incurred for "medical care."
Moreover, it is not clear that there are no bases for prediction under the
current practice. The continual litigation of certain types of claims tends to
provide indicators from which the degree of evidence necessary to support
a claim can reasonably be predicted.60 Thus the weight of the burden of
proof might rest a hundred-fold more heavily upon one claiming a medical
deduction for carfare than for a surgeon's fee. The taxpayer who can suc-
55 H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 218, 219 (1954): "The deduction permitted for 'transportation primarily for and
essential to medical care' clarifies existing law in that it specifically excludes deduction of
any meals and lodging while away from home receiving medical treatment."
56 Embry v. Gray, 143 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Ky. 1956); Robert M. Bilder, 33 T.C. No.
155 (Oct. 26, 1959). In Max Carasso, 34 T.C. No. 119 (Sept. 30, 1960), the claim was dis-
allowed, but the court declined to state a general rule: "There is no showing that the meals
and hotel item herein was proximately related to medical care, apart from its being included
in the traveling expenses. We express no opinion as to whether meals and lodging expenses
might be deductible in other circumstances."
57 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(v) (1957). See also S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
218, 219 (1954).
58 Others might suggest increased rigidity as a matter of fiscal policy to reduce the total
amount of the benefit. Such a reduction could be achieved more equitably and accurately,
however, by changing the minimum percentage and/or maximum amount provisions.
59 Cf. S. D. Winderman, 32 T.C. 1197 (1959).
6o Cf. Francis Hoffman, 17 T.C. 1380, 1386 (1952).
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cessfully bear the heavy burden, however, will not be penalized by an arbi-
trary disallowance. He can attempt to show the merits of his particular claim
and will be judged thereon. If he chooses to contest a decision by the Com-
missioner, he does so with full knowledge of the difficulty.
The practice ofmedicine is continually changing with the increased accumu-
lation of knowledge. A provision for tax relief must be sufficiently flexible
to keep pace with these changes. The current definition of medical care,
when applied by using the general tests, allows for such changes. As long as
the purpose of the tax relief is to aid those afflicted with unusual medical
burdens, the attainment of that goal should not be inhibited by a provision
which may withhold the relief from the most burdened taxpayers.
FORUM-SHOPPING IN THE REVIEW OF NLRB ORDERS
A party who the National Labor Relations Board finds has committed an
unfair labor practice may seek review of the Board's order in a United States
Court of Appeals,' or the Board itself may petition a court of appeals to
obtain judicial sanction for its order.2 The purpose of this comment is to
explore the possibility of forum-shopping, 3 especially with respect to an appeal
by an aggrieved party,4 and to determine the extent to which forum-shopping
is practiced.
I
The accompanying chart comprises all cases decided by the courts of
appeals from January, 1955, through November, 1960,5 in which the NLRB
brought enforcement proceedings or an aggrieved party appealed a final Board
order. The cases are tabulated with reference to the aggrieved party: an
employer, a union or both.6 A court's action with reference to each category
161 Stat. 148-49 (1947) (amended by 72 Stat. 945 (1958)), 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1958),
hereinafter referred to as section 10(0, the section designation of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
2 61 Stat. 147-48 (1947) (amended by 72 Stat. 945 (1958)), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1958),
hereinafter referred to as section 10(e), the section designation of the Labor Management
Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
3 For the purposes of this comment, the term "forum-shopping" is applied whenever an
appeal is taken to a court of appeals in a circuit other than where the unfair labor practice
occurred, or where the aggrieved party has his principal place of business. In these situations,
it will be assumed that the primary reason for the choice of forum is convenience.
4 An aggrieved party can be one against whom an order of the Board is issued, one who
has had a complaint dismissed by the Board, or one who is partially in either category. See
e.g., Kovach v. NLRB, 229 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1956); American Newspaper Publisher's
Ass'n v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1951); Albrecht v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 652 (7th Cir.
1950). Compare Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. NLRB, 267 F.2d 169
(1st Cir. 1959).
5 WsT FEDERAL REPORTER, SECOND Saiuas, 218 F.2d to 284 F.2d.
6 Included in the category "orders against both" are those cases in which the Board's
final order remedied only a portion of the alleged unfair labor practices for which the com-
